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The Mizan Newsletter aims at giving an objective and balanced account of current Soviet writings on the Middle East and Africa

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MIDDLE EAST

Soviet Writing on Jordan reviews Soviet accounts of political forces and movements in Jordan since 1920. It notes that, since the anti-Communist campaign in the UAR, Soviet writers no longer urge unity between Jordan and her Arab neighbours.

Trade Unions in the UAR and Iraq is a note on recent Soviet criticisms of alleged Government interference in trade unions in these two countries.

The Middle East in the Soviet Press includes Soviet comment on the prospects for improved Soviet-Turkish relations.

AFRICA

The Working-Class Movement in Nigeria is an account of Soviet attempts to present the Nigerian independence movement in terms of a mass movement of the Nigerian working class, and in particular the miners.

Africa in the Soviet Press includes Soviet comment on reactions to the Soviet declaration on independence for colonial peoples; comment on developments in the Congo; and the latest expressions of Soviet support for the "Algerian provisional Government".

SOVIET WRITING ON JORDAN

Most of the existing Soviet writing on Jordan appeared during the years 1956-8. Ye.A. Lebedev, the foremost Soviet authority on the country, wrote JORDAN IN THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE (1956); the article on Jordan in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (1956); the chapter on Jordan in THE ARABS IN THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE (1957); and the booklet JORDAN, which went to press in 1958. A.I. Pershits, an ethnologist who specializes in the Arab peoples, contributed the section on Jordan in PEOPLES OF SOUTH-WEST ASIA (1957), and wrote an article "The Arabs of Jordan" in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.6 of 1958.

This writing naturally bore the stamp common to Soviet writing of that period on the subject of the "Arab liberation movement". Nasir was then regarded in the Soviet Union as the leader of this movement, and Soviet comment on events in Jordan tended to follow the Egyptian line. Moves towards Jordanian unity with the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi bloc were welcomed. But, since Nasir's anti-Communist offensive and his quarrel with Iraq, Soviet writers have ceased to depict the "anti-imperialist struggle" in Jordan in terms of the Arab unity movement. Developments in Jordan - as in other Arab countries - are treated on their merits, outside any specifically "Arab" context. Whatever future the leaders of the UAR may have in mind for Jordan, Soviet writers speak firmly about the Jordanian people's aspirations to "independent national development" and now say nothing about any movement within Jordan for unity with neighbouring Arab states.

The change in the Soviet attitude regarding Jordan - like the change in the Soviet attitude regarding the UAR regime - evidently came about at the end of 1958, following Nasir's open declaration of war on the Communist regime in the UAR. Writing in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS of September 1958, Y. Bilinin was still able to mention, with apparent unconcern, the possibility of Jordan's joining the UAR; he quoted a MANCHESTER GUARDIAN correspondent for the view that, before the landing of British troops in Jordan, "had there been a free plebiscite, 70 or 80 per cent of the population would have voted for a republic and for some sort of affiliation with Nasir's nationalism".

It will be recalled that at the XXIst Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in January 1959 Khrushchev, as well as leading members of Middle East Communist Parties, denounced the measures taken against Communists in the UAR. The Congress also received a message from Fuad Nassar, the Secretary of the Jordanian Communist Party, which stated that recent speeches made in the UAR "and the campaign against the brotherly Communist Party of Syria" had "raised alarm not only among the Communists of Jordan but among the widest popular masses and all honourable national forces of Jordan" (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.2 of 1959, appendix p.13). Obviously it

was not in the interests of Jordanian Communists to work for the union of Jordan with a country in which anti-Communism was just as much the order of the day as in Jordan itself.

Since the end of 1958 the scale of Soviet writing on Jordan has considerably diminished, although Soviet comment on the Jordanian regime remains as hostile as before. The present UAR campaign against Jordan receives virtually no support in the Soviet press. Indeed, the influence of the UAR in Jordan has been criticized; in an article in SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK (No.1 of 1960) L. Viktorov said that anti-Communism in the UAR, for which he blamed the Ba'th Party, had its counterpart within the ranks of the "national liberation movement" in Jordan, since Ba'th Party members in Jordan had been ordered by their leaders to denounce Communists "and other patriots" to the police. The Ba'th Party, said Viktorov, was "ultra-nationalist" and "pan-Arab". The term "pan-Arab" is now used by Soviet writers only in a denigratory sense.

However, while the Soviet view of the Arab unity movement has altered, many fundamental Soviet premises about Jordan remain unchanged, and are plainly stated by Lebedev and others in the works referred to above.

Jordan's establishment Lebedev describes the creation of Transjordan as part of "the colonial division of the world to which the victorious states had recourse after the First World War". He says nothing of the Arab independence movement of the time, but dwells at length on the mandatory system which, he says, was invented by Britain, France and the USA as a "new form of colonial oppression"; the growth of the colonial peoples' discontent with imperialist policy, enhanced by the new principles of respect for national rights proclaimed by the Russian Revolution, obliged the capitalist powers to conceal their colonial plans behind subtle disguises. Lebedev notes that at the San Remo Conference of April 1920 Transjordan was included in the Palestine mandate, but that in September 1922 Britain was granted a separate mandate over Jordan; but, he remarks, "the separation of Jordan from Palestine did not in any way mean that Britain intended to create an independent Jordanian state". Jordan had originally been included in the Palestine mandate as a concession to the Zionist leaders, who expected that Jewish colonization would extend across the Jordan; its separation from Palestine removed it from the sphere of Jewish colonization, but was motivated by quite different considerations. Britain wanted to form a "corridor" of dependent states from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and "to turn the territory of this region into a stronghold of its imperialist policy in the Near East". Jordan was centrally situated to exert control over Egypt, Palestine, Iraq and the Persian Gulf states, and also "to enlarge the sphere of British influence by the realization of such plans as 'Greater Syria', the 'Fertile Crescent', etc.". As a communications link it was of first

importance for Britain (Lebedev quotes at length from a talk on this subject given by Peake Pasha at a meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society in 1959, and published in its Journal).

Pershits seems to represent the establishment of Jordan as in itself a blow for the "Arab liberation movement". British imperialism, he says, at first made use of this movement to drive out the Turks, but soon became its declared enemy; the Amir Abdullah "pledged himself to put down the national liberation movement in the country and received means for the formation of a regular army under British officers".

The Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1946, by which "Jordan received formal independence", is regarded by Lebedev as being, in the first place, "a decided victory for the national liberation movement of the Jordanian people", and as one result of the impetus given to the anti-imperialist movement by the Soviet Union's victory over the forces of fascism. But Lebedev also regards it as a British move to forestall any UN trusteeship over Jordan, which might have prevented the continued use of Jordan as a British base, and as a first step towards the creation of a "Greater Syria" under Abdullah's rule and dependent on Britain.

One might have expected that Soviet writers, regarding Jordan as a purely British creation, would logically proceed to deny it any inherent raison d'etre; but this has not happened. It has indeed been spoken of slightingly by at any rate one Soviet writer; N. Khokhlov (IZVESTIYA 28.3.59) referred to it as "this kingdom created in its time 'in the interval between cigar and brandy' by Winston Churchill, as the British themselves joke on the subject". But Jordan's right to exist as a state has not been questioned; and indeed its viability as an economic unit has been championed by Lebedev himself.

Jordan and Arab Palestine In his book on Jordan, published in 1956, Lebedev gives no account of the incorporation of part of Palestine in the Kingdom of Jordan, and does not suggest that in his view there was anything wrong in this. However, in ISRAEL, ITS SITUATION AND POLICY, by K. Ivanov and Z. Sheynis, published in September 1958, a strong attack is made on the part played both by King Abdullah and by Britain in the events attending the union of the West Bank with Jordan. The authors say that the British "tried to prevent the formation on the territory of Palestine of an independent Arab state, as was laid down by the decision of the UN, and strove to ensure that the territory allocated to the Arabs should be united to Abdullah's Transjordanian kingdom, a dependent vassal state of Britain". It was significant, the authors add, that when an Arab Government in Palestine under Ahmad Hilmi Pasha was set up in September 1948, "the only Arab country which did not recognize this Government was Transjordan".

Ivanov and Sheynis go on to depict Abdullah as concluding a deal with Israel at the expense of the Arabs of Palestine:

> "The military reverses of the Arabs who had fought so bravely were connected with circumstances of an ephemeral nature and the fact that the Arab countries lacked unity of purpose and action. The Jordanian King Abdullah was one of the initiators of the armed conflict with Israel, but, as soon as his troops had occupied part of Palestine, he entered into secret talks with Israel and soon virtually dropped out of the war. Later it turned out that talks between the Israeli leaders and King Abdullah about the partition of Palestine had been held even before the creation of the State of Israel. It is significant that the troops of Israel offered practically no resistance to the Jordanian forces at the moment when the latter crossed the Jordanian-Palestinian frontier. Moreover the representatives of Israel in the UN showed an inclination in those months to agree to the transfer of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan. The ruling circles of Israel argued that the transfer of the Arab part of Palestine to Jordan 'is in keeping with Israel's interests' since 'it is not difficult for them to reach an agreement with Abdullah', but it was not known what an independent Arab State in Palestine would be like."

Abdullah's death and the succession The assassination of King Abdullah and the question of the succession are seen by Lebedev as episodes in alleged Anglo-US rivalry for influence in Jordan. In the spring of 1951, he says, the US Charge d'Affaires in Jordan began discussions with the Jordanian Government about the provision for the US armed forces of "a series of privileges in Jordan analogous to those enjoyed by Britain"; in return for Jordan's agreement to this, the USA "promised Abdullah its support in his claims to the Hijaz and some other regions of neighbouring states". But Abdullah did not accept the American offers, preferring the British plans for a "Greater Syria" under British control. To this end he had talks with the Lebanese Premier Riyad as-Sulh in July 1951. But Riyad as-Sulh was assassinated while in Amman; and four days later Abdullah's own assassination followed. "The very fact of the assassination of these two pro-British figures at the moment when they were discussing the implementation of British imperialist plans to the detriment of the interests of the US monopolies shows what forces were operating behind the scenes of these events."

Abdullah's assassin and his accomplices, says Lebedev, were members of "a pro-American terrorist organization". But American interests not only wanted Abdullah out of the way; they wanted to ensure that he was succeeded by his elder son the Amir Tallal, to which Britain was opposed.

"Tallal was known for his anti-British views, and he openly opposed his father's friendship with Britain. Britain sought a pretext for the removal of Tallal from the political arena. Such a pretext was found not long before Abdullah's assassination. At the time of Abdullah's visit to Turkey Tallal, who was formally an officer of the Arab Legion, 'quarrelled' with the Legion's commander the British Gen. Glubb and also, according to Reuter, wounded him. Britain made use of this. The Amir was declared to be 'suffering from neurosis' and was sent to Switzerland for 'a prolonged period of convalescence'. As was clear from American press reports, Abdullah, knowing the anti-British inclinations of his eldest son, intended also to change the law on the succession in favour of his second son, the pro-British Prince Naif. But his assassination prevented him taking this step, and according to the Constitution Tallal had to succeed to the throne. But at that moment there occurred events which bore witness to the fact that the assassination of Abdullah and the struggle for the Jordanian throne were expressions of Anglo-US rivalry."

These "events" which Lebedev proceeds to cite are, firstly, that President Truman sent his message of condolences on the death of King Abdullah not to Naif, who had been appointed Regent in Tallal's absence, but to Tallal himself, although the latter had not yet been proclaimed King - "which meant the recognition of Tallal's rights to the Jordanian Crown". Secondly, Col. Abdullah at-Tall, a leading member of the"pro-American terrorist organization" responsible for Abdullah's assassination, sent to Tallal from Cairo a message of congratulations on his accession; this "once again showed what imperialist forces were interested in Abdullah's murder". Further, Tallal's first measures on his accession showed his pro-American leanings; his speech at the opening of Parliament, read by the Premier, praised US aid to Jordan under the "Four Point" programme; and in September 1951 he began negotiations concerning a plan to unite Jordan with Syria which would have led to the weakening of British influence in both countries. Lebedev maintains that the Jordanian Parliament's declaration of Tallal's unfitness to rule was only a pro-British manoeuvre; "the rumours of Tallal's illness were denied even by the Jordanian diplomatic mission in Paris, where the King was at the beginning of June 1952."

The theme of Anglo-US rivalry is a favourite one in Soviet writing on Jordan, as on other Middle East countries; the purpose of Lebedev's remarkable edifice of invention is presumably not so much to take sides in Jordan's dynastic affairs as to add to the general lurid picture of "imperialist intrigue" in Jordan.

Jordan's economic prospects At the outset of his account of Jordan's natural resources Lebedev declares: "Objectively Jordan possesses the necessary conditions for a normal development of agriculture which would ensure the country the necessary minimum of agricultural products and also create possibilities for their export." He adds that Jordan has "the necessary minimum of lands suitable for cultivation", and observes: "It is well known that in the time of the Roman Empire Jordan was one of its eastern granaries." Bourgeois economists, he says, seek to justify Jordan's economic backwardness by the absence of possibilities for economic development, but even they admit that the total area of land suitable for cultivation "might be brought to" 8 or 8.5 million donums. By "suitable for cultivation", he adds, one must understand "all lands which can be cultivated by means used in countries with a developed agriculture". In the Hellenistic period the country was covered with a vast network of irrigation canals and reservoirs, and the restoration of even half this system would permit the settlement of not less than 100,000 persons on these lands today. "But the sources of water and the irrigation system are in the hands of the landlords and shaykhs, and this prevents their rational utilization. The restoration of the tumbledown and neglected irrigation system demands capital outlays, and this the landlords either cannot or will not undertake." The landlords are also perfectly satisfied with a system by which their land is worked for them either by share-cropping peasants or by landless peasants at starvation wages, and consequently they consider the use of machinery inadvisable.

Lebedev gives an account of Government irrigation projects put forward at intervals from 1937 onwards, and says that "all these projects remained on paper"; they did not represent a serious attempt to improve the irrigation system so much as "an attempt ... in the conditions of the advance of the national liberation movement to deceive the Jordanian people with promises and to inspire them with 'hope for the future' ".

(It may be noted here that the Johnston plan for the sharing of the Jordan's waters between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states has been criticized in the Soviet press. In SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK No.11 of 1959 A. Anatol'yev said that the plan "encountered resolute opposition from the Arabs, who considered it an attempt to decide the problem of the Palestine refugees contrary to the spirit of the UN resolutions, which affirm their right to return to their native land".)

Lebedev also says much about the possibilities for the development of industry in Jordan on the basis of, firstly, its mineral resources, and, secondly, food-processing. All this, he says, "refutes the assertions of bourgeois researchers, who try to justify the backwardness of the Jordanian economy by 'the lack of natural resources' ". Lebedev blames Britain above all for Jordan's economic backwardness; he draws the typical Soviet picture of a "colonial" power exploiting a subject people but at

the same time retarding its economic and social progress. When he comes to speak of US aid to Jordan, he does not seek to minimize its scale, but presents it as basically a weapon of US strategic aims in Jordan.

A favourite theme of Soviet writers on the Middle East countries is the contrast between the economic backwardness of these countries, as a legacy of imperialism, and their potential prosperity if their agricultural and industrial resources were properly developed - developed, that is, in the light of the Soviet example, if not with Soviet assistance. For example, A. Sultanov has written of the bright prospects for the Yemen "when this industrious people begins to exploit its incalculable natural wealth - oil and gold, coal, uranium and silver - when agriculture and industry flourish, when the country becomes rich and well organized" (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.10 of 1959, p.3). Obviously such assertions are over-optimistic, if not fanciful; but they accord with the aims of Soviet solidarity with the aspirations of the Middle East peoples. To over-state the case for Jordan's economic viability serves this Soviet purpose.

Beginnings of the "national liberation movement" Lebedev's account of the "national liberation movement" in Jordan falls into three parts: the inter-war period, the period of the "advance of the national liberation movement" after the Second World War, and the struggle against the Baghdad Pact.

Most of Lebedev's account of the earlier period is occupied with the events of 1928-9. However, he notes that in 1920-2 there were revolts of bedouin tribes in many districts "against the establishment of the British mandatory regime in the country, against the attempts of Zionist organizations to extend the Balfour Declaration to Jordan, and against exorbitant taxes collected by force of arms". He also refers to the support of the Jordanian masses for the Arabs of Palestine "fighting against British colonial rule, wide-scale Zionist immigration and the local feudalists"; attacks by partisan units on British transport, communications and pipelines were an expression of this.

Lebedev gives a lengthy account of popular opposition to the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1928. The campaign of protest against the treaty, he notes, was led by the Jordanian National Party, formed by "a group of bedouin shaykhs and representatives of the not numerous national intelligentsia", which was nevertheless supported by large demonstrations in which "varied sections of the Jordanian population" took part - students, artisans, small traders and employees of various private undertakings. The new Constitution hurriedly promulgated on 16th April 1928 was an attempt to pacify the opposition and to ensure ratification of the treaty; but its undemocratic nature only aroused further opposition. The nation-wide protest campaign led to the calling of a National Congress headed by

the National Party; despite Abdullah's attempt to neutralize it by a pretence of Government patronage, it passed a resolution, the National Covenant, which partly accorded with national aspirations.

> "The National Covenant was to a large extent an inconsistent and imperfect document. It put forward no radical programme on the agrarian question or on labour legislation, and indicated no road for struggle for Jordan's national independence. Its authors conceded, although expressing reservation, that Abdullah should remain the Head of State, and agreed to the preservation of the mandatory system. The unquestionable positive importance of the National Covenant consists in the fact that, at least formally, its direction was anti-imperialist. It emphasized that Jordan was an independent Arab State, and it expressed refusal to bear the burden of expenses for any foreign occupation forces. The British subsidy was considered as a means for ensuring the strategic interests of Britain, giving her the right to control Jordan's finances. This, in particular, explains the wide support which the people's masses, striving for national independence, gave to the Covenant."

However, Lebedev criticizes the subsequent conduct of the National Congress leaders. He notes that they boycotted the election on which Abdullah counted to bring in a parliament that would ratify the Anglo-Jordanian treaty; but, at the moment when British forces and the Arab Legion were preparing to put down popular risings, the National Congress leaders "expressing the interests of the propertied classes ... did not bring themselves to raise the people's masses in open armed struggle for the independence of their country". When the treaty was finally ratified, arousing indignation throughout the country, the National Congress limited itself to protests and parliamentary struggle; "such an attitude reflected its desire to obtain satisfaction of its demands by negotiations and agreement with the mandatory authorities and Abdullah."

The Jordanian Communist Party After the Second World War, says Lebedev, "the national liberation movement in Jordan assumed more organized forms and a more mass character; demonstrations and strikes became the basic forms of the class struggle of the workers". The struggle embraced many classes of the population - "the rising working class and national bourgeoisie, the progressive bourgeois intelligentsia, the students, the petty bourgeoisie, the peasants and also individual representatives of the feudalists and landlords who were discontented with the oppression of the imperialists". Together with demands for better conditions and labour legislation the workers put forward political demands - for democratic freedoms and the repeal of reactionary laws suppressing workers' organizations, and for full national independence and rejection of Anglo-US military entanglements. Lebedev goes on to give an account

of popular indignation against the Anglo-Jordanian treaties of 1946 and 1948, and the "wave of terror" which followed Abdullah's assassination in 1951; and he then speaks of the "peace movement" in Jordan.

In 1951, he says, the campaign to collect signatures to the appeal of the Berlin World Peace Congress had "great success". "Clandestinely distributed pamphlets of the Jordanian Peace Defenders' Committee drew attention to the threat represented by frontier incidents inspired by the imperialists on the borders between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries, and called for resolute struggle against the repetition of such incidents and against the growing arms race." The campaign for signatures "coincided with the struggle against the anti-democratic internal policy of the Jordanian Government and especially against the imposition of a new military tax". In a short time, despite police persecution, 45,600 Jordanians signed the peace appeal. There were also demonstrations against US intervention in Korea; "together with all honest people throughout the world the Jordanian people come out in defence of the Korean People's Democratic Republic." A new factor in the movement for national liberation and peace was the wide participation of Jordan's women in the struggle.

But the "most distinctive feature" of the post-war liberation movement in Jordan, says Lebedev, was the fact that the Jordanian Communist Party, formed in 1951, was in the vanguard of this movement. It was no accident that Jordanian reaction directed its main blow at the Communist Party and above all its leadership. Its Secretary-General Fuad Nassar and a number of other leading Party workers were arrested in December 1951. In February 1952 the Secretary of the Peace Defenders' Committee, Hasan an-Nabulsi, and other activists of the movement were arrested. An appeal by the Party's Central Committee denouncing the "infamous plot" against its leaders "evoked a wide response in the hearts of all honest people in Jordan and neighbouring countries". When the case opened, 28 advocates defended Nassar and his comrades - one of them a former minister, and most of them parliamentary deputies or former deputies. Sixty-eight advocates in the Lebanon and 38 in Syria also applied for permission to defend Nassar. The Israeli Communist Party addressed appeals to world public opinion to support Nassar.

Fuad Nassar's condemnation to 10 years of hard labour, says Lebedev, "could not stifle the voice of the people's masses". Further in his book Lebedev notes that on 31st July 1956, during the period when the "repressive measures against patriots" were being reversed, the Council of Ministers decided on Nassar's release. Lebedev says little about the subsequent activities of the Jordanian Communist Party, except that it "continued and continues to lead the struggle of the people's masses for freedom and independence of their country".

The Baghdad Pact The subsequent political history of Jordan is presented by Lebedev in terms of "the struggle against the Baghdad Pact". The "aggressive nature" of the pact, he says, was at once exposed by the Soviet Union, and was denounced by the Jordanian Communist Party in a declaration made at the time of President Bayar's visit to Jordan in November 1955; and in January 1956 the Central Committee of the Israeli Communist Party passed a resolution expressing solidarity with the Jordanian people's struggle against the pact. But Lebedev makes a point of the fact that the most varied political forces in Jordan (many of them earlier and subsequently condemned as "reactionary" in Soviet writings) took part in the movement. Those participating, he says, included religious organizations and the Muslim Brotherhood; the Higher Arab Committee of Palestine; the National Socialist and Ba'th Parties; and the Arab refugees. Of the latter Lebedev says: "The Palestine refugees, among whom there was a fairly considerable layer of representatives of the working class and the progressive bourgeois intelligentsia, could not fail to activize the national liberation movement in Jordan." The National Front is praised as an organization of "the progressive patriotic forces of the country".

Lebedev gives particular attention to the activities of the "Free Officers" movement in the Arab Legion, and its demands for rejection of the Baghdad Pact and the dismissal of Gen. Glubb. After an account of the circumstances attending Gen. Glubb's dismissal, Lebedev observes that this event, by reducing British influence in Jordan, made possible the closer solidarity of Jordan with the other Arab States opposing the Baghdad Pact; and he ends on a note of approval for measures towards military and economic unity between Jordan and her Arab neighbours.

The overthrow of the Nabulsi Government In his booklet JORDAN Lebedev refers to the Nabulsi Government as the "democratic Government" of Jordan. The abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was acclaimed in the Soviet press of the time (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No.3 of 1957). It was noted (IA No.6 of 1957) that the Nabulsi Government early in April 1957 decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

> "This policy angered both the Western circles and the reactionary groups in the country. American diplomacy and the intelligence service directly participated in the anti-governmental plot. They failed to win over the national, patriotic sections of the population; consequently they and their henchmen had to rely heavily on the feudal and monarchistic elements. According to the foreign press, the US Ambassador secretly passed 10 million dollars to King Husayn with which to bribe the tribal chiefs and leaders of the reactionary Muslim Brotherhood. With US backing the reactionary groups forced the Nabulsi Government to resign ... The USA

resorted to direct threats. The Defence Secretary threatened to send American troops to the country, while the commander of the US Sixth Fleet, which steamed to the eastern Mediterranean, said there was the possibility of atomic weapons being used."

The Soviet journalist P. Demchenko, who entered Jordan from Syria at the time of the crisis, gave a lengthy account (SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK No.3 of 1957) of events in Amman from early in April until the end of the month, when he left.

The dispatch of British forces to Jordan in July 1958, as might be expected, brought the subject of the "national liberation movement" in Jordan again to the fore in the Soviet press. It was again affirmed (A.I. Pershits, op.cit.) that the widest sections of the population "and even some patriotically intentioned feudalists" participated in this movement, whose aims were national independence, democratic freedoms and "unity with the brotherly Arab peoples". As has been already noted, the latter slogan is now absent from Soviet writing on Jordan. But the "popular front" theme is kept to the fore; the statements of the self-styled Jordanian "National Front" are quoted in the Soviet press, and it is emphasized that the Jordanian Communist Party seeks to rally all forces opposed to the regime. A recent survey of the Communist Parties of the eastern countries (SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK No.3 of 1960) said of the Jordanian Communist Party that it "fights for the unity of action of the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie in the towns and also all honest patriots who oppose the forces of reaction".

TRADE UNIONS IN THE UAR AND IRAQ

The subject of Government interference in trade union activity in both the UAR and Iraq has recently received notice in the Soviet press. (Note: While it is convenient to review together the measures complained of in both countries, it should be noted that Soviet commentators draw no connection between them.)

UAR SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK No.9 of 1960 published the following account of new labour legislation in the Syrian region of the UAR:

"A new unified labour law has recently been brought into force in the Syrian region of the UAR. The Syrian labour law passed by parliament in 1946 has been annulled.

"Article 162 of the new law permits the setting up of only one trade union of workers and employees of one and the same branch of the economy. This means that, after the official union has been set up, no other workers' organization will be registered by the authorities. According to Article 177 of the labour law general trade union meetings can only be held with the permission of 'responsible persons' and under their control.

"The new law declares a strike a crime against the State. A dispute between workers and employers must be settled by a 'conciliation commission' composed of six men: the employer, the director of the administrative body, the president of the court of the first instance and representatives of the workers.

"Article 194 considers the decisions of the commission competent if they are adopted by four members including the judge and the representative of the administrative body - that is, the commission can in fact work without the participation of the workers' representatives.

"Article 66 gives employers the right to impose a fine on a worker within the limits of his wages for five days. In addition, the employer has the right to suspend a worker from work for up to five days. Thus the employer can deprive the worker and his family of ten days' wages."

Iraq TRUD of 27th October published extracts of an open letter to Qasim from Ali Shukr, Secretary-General of the Iraqi trade union federation, published in ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B, on the subject of the recent elections of trade union committees in Iraq. TRUD introduced the extracts as follows:-

> "In a number of cases the local authorities have had recourse to falsification of the results of these elections, and to planting reactionary political figures on these trade union committees. The activities of the authorities have aroused the discontent and protest of local progressive circles, expressed in the patriotic newspapers."

In his open letter to Qasim, Ali Shukr said that at the time of the revolution of 14th July 1958 the workers of Iraq had "come out in support of the victorious Army ... and proved their devotion to the national republican regime". In the first year after the revolution there had been an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between the working masses; trade unions had been organized, and the trade union federation had been set up. "But already in the second year after the revolution the authorities began to apply repressive measures against trade union centres in Baghdad and their branches in the provinces, and also against the leadership of the trade union federation." Hundreds of trade union leaders and activists were arrested without cause. Early in 1960 workers of a number of enterprises were subjected to arrest and persecution under

various pretexts, and subsequently a campaign began for the liquidation of trade union organizations, the planting of reactionary elements in the trade union leadership and the deprivation of the workers of their lawful right to elect their representatives. The trade union leaders were deprived of the right of conducting preparations for the elections and fixing the dates and place for them; and in many unions elections had been carried out on the orders of the authorities in violation of the law.

In the "elections" of the railway workers' union, said Ali Shukr, there had been interference by the management, the police and security organs, and there had been dismissals and arrests of workers. "The falsified elections of the railway workers' trade union leadership were an example of the 'freedom' in the third year of our victorious revolution." Another example was in Mosul, where the authorities insisted that workers voting should furnish an assurance that they had not been on trial, and where "the workers were intimidated by hired bandits and prevented from voting, and voting papers were distributed to persons having no connection with the union in question". Ali Shukr went on:

> "We ask you, is this interference in the elections of the leadership of the working class - which is a class devoted to the national regime - in the interests of the republic and the national Government? Is the removal of devoted trade unionists, and their replacement by reactionaries, in their interests?"

Throughout the country workers were being persecuted, deprived of their rights and thrown into prison. Ali Shukr concluded by expressing the hope that the authorities would cease this campaign, that the unlawful falsification of the elections would be stopped, that trade union liberties would be restored, and that imprisoned workers would be released and those dismissed reinstated in their jobs.

(Note: On 8th April 1960 TRUD published a letter to its editor from a Basrah trade unionist who complained of arrests and dismissals among Iraqi trade unionists; see MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.5 of 1960)

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on Middle East events appearing in Soviet newspapers during the period 11th October - 7th November.

Turkey Articles on the occasion of Turkey's National Day (PRAVDA 29.10.60 and IZVESTIYA 30.10.60) dwelt at some length on the prospects for an improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations following the change of regime

in Turkey. In PRAVDA I.Sergeyev said that there had been "some development" in Turkish-Soviet relations following the exchange of messages between Khrushchev and Gen. Gursel, and Gen. Gursel's recent press conference at which he expressed hopes of a further improvement in relations. There were obvious difficulties in the way; ten years of participation in Western military blocs had led Turkey along a road far from friendship with the Soviet Union. But these and other difficulties could be overcome by "appropriate efforts in this direction by the Turkish side". Already, despite its commitments in military blocs, the Turkish Government had shown that it was trying to pursue a more independent policy. The future would show whether indeed the Turkish leaders would return to Ataturk's policy of friendship with the Soviet Union, which accorded with the true interests of the Turkish people and of world peace.

IZVESTIYA (30.10.60) gave an account of a Moscow television broadcast by the Turkish Ambassador Adm. Fahri Koruturk on the occasion of Turkish National Day. Adm. Koruturk spoke of the Turkish people's pleasure at the prospect of restoration of good-neighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

On 19th October IZVESTIYA reported that a large group of Soviet tourists had arrived in Istanbul. On 30th October the paper reported that a delegation of the chambers of commerce and industry of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other large towns in Turkey had arrived in Moscow to explore possibilities for the development of Soviet-Turkish trade relations.

Other reports on the situation in Turkey, however, were less favourable. A Tass report from Istanbul (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA 12.10.60) said that oil workers in Izmir had gone on hunger strike in protest against their conditions of work, and had sent a telegram to the Minister of Labour which stated: "The oppression to which we were subjected until 27th May still continues in all its horrors." An article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (6.10.60) denounced the visit of US warships to Istanbul as being - together with the recent NATO exercises in the eastern Mediterranean - a "military demonstration" directed against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries; but nothing was said about Turkey's attitude in this connection.

The Soviet press published reports on the trial of members of the former Turkish Government. On 19th October PRAVDA published a satirical account of alleged attempts by US "propaganda experts" in Turkey to "cover up" revelations about US conduct in Turkey which had been made in the course of the Yassiada trials.

UAR A Tass report (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 15.10.60) of Nasir's speech to the UAR National Assembly on 12th October, about the UN General Assembly session, gave particular attention to Nasir's account of his two meetings with Khrushchev. It was noted that Nasir said that the friendship between the UAR and the Soviet Union "is an example of the relations which must exist between countries with different social systems".

The prospects for increased trade between the UAR and the USSR were the subject of a statement made to the press in Moscow on 11th October by Hasan Abbas Zaki, the Minister of Economy of the Egyptian region (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 13.10.60). He said that "the basic points of a project of a long-term trade agreement" had been discussed in Moscow, and it had been decided to form a special commission to prepare this agreement. A UAR delegation would visit the USSR within two months to conclude the agreement.

Iraq PRAVDA of 23rd October reported that the Baghdad publishing house "Ar-Rabitah" had issued a brochure with an Arabic translation of Khrushchev's address of 23rd September to the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Government's statement on disarmament, and the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial peoples. Ten thousand copies of the brochure had been issued.

(For an item in TRUD on the position of the trade unions in Iraq, see the preceding article "Trade Unions in the UAR and Iraq".)

THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT IN NIGERIA

Since Marxism-Leninism teaches that the working class is the most progressive and revolutionary class of society, it is inevitable that Soviet writers stress the role of the working class in the "national liberation movements" of the colonial territories, even though they acknowledge that in most African colonies it is weak and comparatively unorganized. In an article written to mark Nigeria's independence ("From the History of the Workers' Movement in Nigeria", PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA No.4 of 1960), L.N. Pribytkovskiy describes how the general strike of 1945 and the events in Enugu in 1949 "led to the activization of the mass anti-imperialist movement", forcing the British Government to make political concessions.

Composition and organization of the working class Pribytkovskiy starts by saying that the British colonialists have deliberately hindered the local development of the manufacturing industries, with the result that the industrial proletariat is concentrated in the mining industry and transport. The working class is drawn mainly from the peasants, the majority of whom maintain their links with the village and agriculture. A large number of the workers are in fact peasants working seasonally away from home. "All this shows that the process of formation of the Nigerian proletariat is far from complete, and the overwhelming majority of workers are only first-generation proletarians. Such a situation naturally seriously hindered and hinders the setting up of trade unions and other class associations and also the development of the economic and political struggle of the Nigerian proletariat. At the same time it has favoured to a considerable extent the penetration of the progressive ideas current among the workers into the most distant agricultural regions of the country." Trade unions were not recognized in Nigeria until 1939 but grew quickly during the war years, so that by 1945 there were 106 with nearly 40,000 members.

The general strike of 1945 Pribytkovskiy describes what he calls "the exceedingly grave material situation of the workers and office employees" which led the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees of Government Undertakings to call a strike in June 1945. Wages had not kept pace with rising prices, so that they did not even cover expenditure on food, of which there was moreover a shortage. The strike, says Pribytkovskiy, was only called after the colonial authorities had procrastinated and finally refused to satisfy the demand for a 50 per cent increase in the cost of living allowance. The strike which started in government and municipal undertakings in Lagos and other towns soon spread and embraced those employed in private enterprise and many who did not belong to any trade union. "The strike assumed an all-national

significance," says Pribytkovskiy, "and all the progressive forces of Nigeria ... supported the struggle of the working-class, justifiably regarding it as an integral part of the anti-imperialist movement." The colonial authorities arrested some of the strikers and their leaders and banned newspapers which supported them but the strikers refused to give in to this "mass terror" and only resumed work after the authorities agreed to a full and impartial review of their demands. The commission finally appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies was forced to admit the validity of the workers' demands and recommend a 50 per cent increase in the cost of living allowance. Pribytkovskiy describes the first general strike of 1945 as "a turning point in the history of the workers' and whole national liberation movement of Nigeria. ... Although economic causes lay at the basis of the strike its importance goes far beyond the bounds of a purely economic struggle ... It made a start for mass action by the workers, employees, peasants and other sections of the population against the imperialist policy of merciless exploitation and cruel political repression and marked a new upsurge in the anti-colonial struggle."

The NCNC and the Richards' Constitution Pribytkovskiy considers that the strike also revealed the weakness of the workers' movement; in particular there were a large number of small trade unions but no united powerful class organisation which could head the workers' struggle. The biggest political party of the national bourgeoisie, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, by supporting the strike, was able to strengthen the leading role of the national bourgeoisie in the national liberation movement. Pribytkovskiy claims that it was under the influence of the general strike that the British introduced the Richards' Constitution in January 1947. This did not satisfy the Nigerian people, but the NCNC limited itself to non-violent methods in its campaign against the constitution and its "inconsistency and indecisiveness" caused a lull in the national liberation struggle at the end of the 1940s. The colonialists however had no intention of abandoning the use of force in routing the forces of the national liberation movement and "decided to strike a blow at the most consistent and active force of the anti-imperialist movement, the heroic working class of Nigeria".

The events at Enugu in November 1949 According to Pribytkovskiy the facts show that the shooting down of the coalminers who were on strike at Enugu in November 1949 was a "carefully thought out ... provocation by the colonialists". The coalminers went on a go-slow strike in support of an "extremely moderate" demand for an increase in their "wretched level of wages". The administration started to dismiss the miners and use strike-breakers, but the miners refused to give in. The administration then decided to close the mines, after removing the explosives from the stores. It was while the explosives were being removed that the

shooting occurred. Pribytkovskiy says that the fact that beds in the local hospital were vacated two days before the shooting and the police were armed with rifles which they did not usually carry showed that it was a carefully prepared provocation, and gave the lie to the official version of shooting in 'self-defence'. Yu.P. Mador in an article entitled "The Position of the Miners of Nigeria in the First Year after the Second World War and the Events in Enugu (November 1949)" (KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA XLI, AFRIKANSKIY SBORNIK, Moscow, 1959) elaborates on this and claims that from the beginning of the go-slow strike the Government tried to provoke the workers so that they could use force. First the talks of the conciliation council were disrupted by the Government representatives. Like the dismissals, the decision to remove the explosives from the mines was also calculated to provoke the miners' resistance, since it would have left them without work for a long time. Tales of 'self-defence' against miners 'armed to the teeth', says Mador, were obviously nonsense in view of the fact that not one policeman was even slightly wounded.

Pribytkovskiy continues that the colonialists "miscalculated" and the "massacre" aroused a wave of strikes and demonstrations all over the country. As events developed the struggle of the workers of Enugu "assumed an ever more distinct political character" and "workers, employees, intelligentsia and other sections of the population ... came out against the whole system of colonial oppression". Memoranda presented to the commission of enquiry showed clearly that "the mass actions of the population ... went far beyond the bounds of a movement of solidarity with the miners of Enugu and had turned in essence into a general national struggle against a regime of merciless exploitation, terror, coercion and political oppression". Even the official report was forced to admit that there was "general dissatisfaction with the British colonial administration". The events in Enugu led to the "consolidation of various detachments of the national liberation movement". An Extraordinary National Committee was set up in Lagos which held protest meetings and demanded a commission of enquiry.

The working class and the bourgeoisie Pribytkovskiy sums up by saying that "the events in Enugu, like the general strike ... in 1943, were the beginning of a new upsurge of the national liberation movement". The NCNC leaders' support for the miners had "facilitated the transformation of the workers' economic struggle into a mass general national political struggle", and this "again allowed the bourgeoisie represented by the NCNC to keep for itself the leadership of the liberation movement and strengthen its influence among fairly broad sections of the workers of the country".

Pribytkovskiy does not make it clear whether he approves of this alliance of working class and "national bourgeoisie". Earlier, the Soviet view was that the interests of the working class in Nigeria were best served by such an alliance. I.I. Potekhin in NARODY AFRIKI (Moscow 1954) criticized British trade union advisers for recommending to the Nigerian Trade Union Congress in 1948 that it should leave the NCNC "under the pretext of setting up a workers' party independent of existing parties 'which are led by the middle classes' ". Potekhin said this was a "heavy blow to the democratic forces of Nigeria", since the Trade Union Congress had united trade unions from all parts of Nigeria and has thus been the decisive factor in making the NCNC an all-Nigerian organization.

More recently ("The Disintegration of the Colonial System in Africa", PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA No.1 of 1960) Potekhin referred to the political role of trade unions in Africa as a whole. He said that "the lack of independent working-class parties in the majority of African countries" meant that "the working class has not yet become the political leader of the broad popular masses struggling against colonialism". But "in certain circumstances the role of leader of the working class and its representative before the broad popular masses can be carried out by the trade unions led by theoretically trained leaders".

Evaluation of the degree of "theoretical training" of the Nigerian trade union leaders no doubt determines the Soviet attitude towards them. In present circumstances, while the NCNC is still regarded as providing political leadership, the working class is looked to as what Potekhin calls "the most consistent and active force of the anti-imperialist movement". This explains the concern of Soviet writers to present it as the real hero of the independence movement.

AFRICA IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on African affairs appearing in the Soviet press during the period 12th October - 8th November 1960.

The Declaration on Independence for Colonial Peoples

The "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples", which was presented by Khrushchev to the UN General Assembly in his speech of 23rd September, was given publicity in the Soviet press, and favourable reactions of leaders of African and other states were prominently reported. NEW TIMES (No. 41 of 1960) said of the reactions of the

Western powers that "their attitude to the Declaration will most certainly become the touchstone by which the good intentions of the states will be tested".

The attitude of the UN itself to the declaration was the subject of a dispatch to IZVESTIYA (29.10.60) from its correspondents N. Karev and N. Polyanov in New York. They said they had visited the office of the Secretary-General of the UN, and also the office of the President of the General Assembly, to ask when the colonial question would be discussed by the Assembly, but they had received no satisfactory reply. The majority in the Assembly had "wrung agreement out of the West" to discuss the declaration, but "one might imagine that an age, and not only two weeks, had passed since that memorable day ... A plenary session of the Assembly cannot be held to discuss one of the most burning questions of the present day - the full and immediate liquidation of colonialism, this repulsive legacy of the barbarity and savagery of past ages". Scarcely had the Assembly resolved to discuss the declaration than the colonialists began to "undermine" it by various means - by talking about "the threat from the North" to the African and Asian states, by threatening to slam the doors of the banks against them and to take "disciplinary measures" as in the case of Cuba. Conversely, the Americans sought to win the favour of the African states by offering them dollar aid - in return for "mutual security" commitments, or in other words permitting NATO bases on African soil - and by spreading rumours about the "imminent return to power of Premier Lumumba" and a "conciliation commission" for the Congo. The object was to drag out the Assembly discussions on the colonial question and to conclude them with an "empty resolution" which would "bury" the Soviet declaration; but, in fact, "the colonialists are digging a grave for themselves".

Congo

Events in the Congo received close attention in the Soviet press during this period. The theme of popular opposition to Col. Mobutu was emphasized. The earlier Soviet picture of the UN command as working solely in the interests of the Western powers began to be less sharply drawn; it was claimed that the criticism of its activities voiced by Soviet and African representatives at the UN General Assembly had produced a modification of its attitude. But the UN command continued to be criticized for "keeping Lumumba under house arrest" and for refusing to recognize "the lawful Government of the Congo". Commentators continued to represent the USA as the power behind Mobutu. It was claimed that Belgians were returning to the Congo in large numbers to assist Mobutu and Tshombe. The following is a short account of newspaper reports and comment.

16.10.60 A Tass dispatch from Accra, in PRAVDA, quoted the GHANA TIMES for reports that South African troops had begun to arrive in Katanga to assist Tshombe; the first contingent of 300 had arrived in US aircraft, and the Americans were supplying them with arms and equipment. The Ghana press also reported that Mobutu was beginning to lose the support of the army; his troops surrounding Lumumba's residence had left their posts, saying that they would not take part in Lumumba's arrest.

17.10.60 PRAVDA quoted the Yugoslav agency Tanyug for demonstrations against Mobutu, in support of Lumumba. (Tanyug reports from Leopoldville have been widely used in the Soviet press.)

21.10.60 A Tass dispatch from London, in PRAVDA, reported the demand by Kamitatu, the Governor of Leopoldville province, that Mobutu's forces should stop their "terror and outrages against the population" and withdraw from the province within 48 hours.

24.10.60 V. Vasil'yev, in PRAVDA, said that Mobutu's "impudent ultimatums" had been rejected by Rajeshwar Dayal, and Mobutu was going to New York to complain to Hammarskjoeld. Mobutu in fact had "something in common" with Hammarskjoeld, since, according to the Damascus AN-NASR, Mobutu had in his service "Belgian officers disguised in the uniform of the Congolese army, and the advice for their disguise was given to the Belgians by none other than Hammarskjoeld". The Mobutu clique was on the verge of collapse, "but the colonialists are not ceasing their intrigues". A new puppet had appeared on the scene, Boboso, appointed by Mobutu to take his place while he was away; he was commander of the Thysville armoured brigade, and according to Associated Press was a "strong man" who would restore order among Mobutu's troops and achieve the overthrow of Lumumba's Government. But no manoeuvres by the colonialists could defeat the African peoples' determination to be free.

27.10.60 PRAVDA said that the direct links between Mobutu and the US Embassy had now become so obvious that he was completely discredited and isolated. His attempt to bring into Leopoldville the Thysville armoured brigade had failed. "His support from US representatives, and above all from the US representative in the UN command, Charles Bohlen, did not avail him." In the UN command there were "sober persons" who saw the necessity to oppose this "adventurist". The Indian Gen. Rikhye had ordered UN forces to stop the entry of the armoured brigade into Leopoldville. The Indian UN representative Rajeshwar Dayal had rejected Mobutu's "impudent demand" to recognize his "commissioners" as the lawful Government of the Congo, and had ordered Mobutu's forces to leave the African quarters of Leopoldville, where they were robbing, killing and

creating terror. The UN contingents from African countries were "preventing Hammarskjoeld's further use of the UN forces in the interests of the colonizers"; Mobutu's representative in New York, Adola, had been asking for the UN personnel to be "changed". All this revealed the "isolation" of Mobutu and the other "traitors to the Congolese people".

28.10.60 IZVESTIYA said that the UN administration in the Congo was faced by "a serious new military threat" in the reappearance of Belgian officers in Congolese military units, acting behind the scenes "to frustrate the present tasks of the UN". Belgian staff officers could now be seen again in the military camps; recently 36 Congolese were sent to continue their training in the Belgian military academy. PRAVDA said that Belgian aircraft were daily bringing large numbers of Belgians into the Congo capital; the number of Belgians there had increased from 4,500 at the end of July to 6,500. This had been stated in an official UN report prepared in Leopoldville for submission to Hammarskjoeld; the report said that these developments were part of a coordinated plan.

2.11.60 IZVESTIYA said that "political chaos" continued in the Congo, with Lumumba a prisoner of the UN forces, while "the imperialists have been urgently seeking the replacement of their puppet Mobutu". About 2,000 members of the Belgian colonial administration had returned, and UN advisers were in effect working under them. PRAVDA published a dispatch from Accra about indignation expressed in Ghana at the removal of Ghana forces from Leopoldville to Luluabourg, which "must have been done not without the interference of Mobutu's Western friends".

3.11.60 PRAVDA gave an account of an article in the Indian weekly BLITZ which alleged that Mobutu was "directed from behind the scenes by the US Ambassador Timberlake", and called him "a by-product of Hammarskjoeld's policy", since he had received from the UN the money to buy the soldiers' support. But the Soviet and African representatives' denunciation of Hammarskjoeld's policy at the General Assembly, said PRAVDA, had made it difficult for the UN forces to continue to be used in the interests of the colonialists. The large participation of African contingents in the UN force, and the fact that Rajeshwar Dayal of India was now the Secretary-General's personal representative, meant that there was every possibility for "creating conditions for the renewal of the work of the Congolese parliament".

6.11.60 IZVESTIYA gave a lengthy account of Rajeshwar Dayal's report to Hammarskjoeld on the Congo situation. It was noted in particular that the report denounced Belgian "sabotage" of the UN resolutions, alleged that Belgian officers were advising Mobutu, and stated that Mobutu's

"commissioners" were more prepared to listen to their Belgian advisers than to cooperate with the UN. However, IZVESTIYA remarked that the report "passes over in silence the role of the USA ... in directing the activities of the Belgian colonialists", and also that it placed on the same level Lumumba's "lawful" Government and Mobutu's "puppet" regime.

Algeria

PRAVDA (23.10.60) reported the arrival in Tunis of the Soviet motorship Fatezh with a consignment of gifts from the Soviet trade unions for Algerian refugees - 154 tons of various goods, including tractors, motor vehicles, agricultural machines, machine tools, sewing machines, clothing, footwear, foodstuffs and medical supplies, to a total value of 2 m. rubles. TRUD (16.10.60) said that the machine tools included lathes and milling machines, which would be used for training, and 16 sewing machines for training in the tailoring trade. Arab students in Moscow had given one present - a cross-country vehicle. Trubnikov, the Soviet trade union representative accompanying the consignment, was conveying to the Algerians an invitation for 120 young Algerians to come to the USSR for technical training in industry, and for a group of orphans to come to the Artek pioneer camp for a holiday. Some Algerian trade unionists would shortly visit the USSR to study the work of Soviet trade unions.

Soviet comment on the Algerian conflict continued to urge that the only way to resolve it was by means of negotiations. An article by "Observer" in PRAVDA of 27th October said that "the possibilities of peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem by means of negotiations between the interested sides have always existed and still exist". The Melun negotiations of June showed that the French Government wished to impose on the Algerians its own conditions for settling the Algerian problem, and did not wish to accord them the right to self-determination of which de Gaulle had repeatedly spoken. De Gaulle had, outwardly, rejected the "Algerie francaise" slogan of the extremists, but his decision to continue the war played into their hands. De Gaulle's creation of "commissions of representatives" for Algeria - "chosen from the ranks of traitors to the Algerian people" - was part of a plan "to fasten a new colonial status on Algeria". The Algerian provisional Government's proposal for a popular referendum under UN control was finding increasing world support. In continuing the war in Algeria France was only supported by the NATO bloc, and above all by the USA; France was using US arms against the Algerians. PRAVDA continued:

> "It is legitimate to assume that, if other imperialist states assist France to prosecute the war in Algeria, then the provisional Algerian Government, expressing the interests of

the people, has the right to receive aid from the states which adopt anti-colonial positions, including the socialist countries."

French claims that the Algerians were unfit for self-government, said PRAVDA, were belied by the situation in the liberated areas, where the provisional Government, having restored the basic rights of the population after 130 years of colonial rule, enjoyed an authority which even bourgeois journalists had admitted. "The termination of the war would allow France to establish new relations with a free Algeria on the basis of historically formed links." The Soviet Government, while ready to make any efforts to strengthen Soviet-French relations, was resolved to champion the cause of freedom and peace; French ruling circles must understand that the fighting people of Algeria would win their freedom.

PRAVDA of 1st November published an interview given to the Tass correspondent in Cairo by Krim Belkasim, Vice-Premier of the "Algerian provisional Government". Belkasim said that a renewal of negotiations was "hardly likely at the present time". Belkasim expressed satisfaction at Soviet de facto recognition of the "provisional Government", and at the aid sent on the Soviet motorship Fatezh.

Other Countries

Guinea PRAVDA and TRUD of 18th October published articles on the departure for Guinea of a party of 38 Soviet technicians who would spend five months surveying and planning a new railway line from Conakry to Mamu. The existing Conakry-Kankan line, said PRAVDA, was built in a hurry by the "French colonialists" in order to penetrate the rich interior of the country as rapidly as possible; on this now dangerous line "disaster followed disaster". The new line would be "better and more economical".

Cameroons Under the heading "Shame on the murderers" PRAVDA of 5th November reported the death of Felix Moumie in a Geneva hospital; it said that according to a statement published by "the committee of African organizations" in London, he had been poisoned by members of the "Red Hand" French terrorist organization. The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee had sent a telegram of condolences to the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization.

Nigeria A Tass dispatch from London (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA 22.10.60) quoted Reuter for the report that the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons had published a statement demanding nationalization of the basic sectors of Nigeria's economy - banks, mines, electricity supply, the metallurgical and foodstuffs industries, and foreign trade.

Ghana A Tass dispatch from Accra (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 22.10.60) quoted President Nkrumah as saying, in a speech on 18th October, that no decisive successes in securing world peace were possible until the Western countries became "less fanatical towards Communism and towards everything that happens in Russia". From his talks with Khrushchev in New York he was convinced that Russia wanted peace more than anything in the world.

IZVESTIYA (16.10.60) reported the arrival in Moscow of a Ghana delegation for trade discussions, and later (23.10.60) reported the delegation's reception by Khrushchev in the Kremlin. A Tass dispatch from Accra (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30.10.60) reported the arrival in Ghana, under the terms of the Soviet-Ghanaian agreement, of a group of Soviet technicians - geologists, electrical engineers, civil engineers, architects and agriculture and fishery experts.

Ethiopia A Tass dispatch from Addis Ababa (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 7.10.60) said that work on the technical school for 1,000 pupils, to be built as a gift to Ethiopia from the Soviet Union, would begin at Bahar-Dar at the end of this year, and the school would be completed in 1962. A group of Soviet specialists had left for Bahar-Dar to survey the site. SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA of 19th October published a long article by a Soviet journalist, T. Suvanberdiyev (from his name, a Central Asian Muslim), on his visit to Bahar-Dar and on the curiosities of the Lake Tana region and of Ethiopia in general.

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